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Title of Dissertation:  Sustainably Leveraging the Blue Economy through 
Public Private Partnerships: A Case Study of 
Namibia’s Port Development 
 
Degree:    Master of Science 
 
Traditionally ports are considered key drivers for socio – economic development and 
trade facilitation, but budget deficits, lack of resources and the call for quality 
infrastructure and services, amongst other reasons, have given impetus to the need for 
Namibia to use Public – Private Partnerships (PPPs) to close infrastructure gaps and 
achieve value for money in sustainably delivering development projects. 
Every mega Namibian port development project has the potential of being procured 
under Namibia’s Public – Private Partnership (“PPP”) legislative and regulatory 
framework and the extant literature on PPPs suggest that most PPPs fail in the absence 
of the application of critical PPP success factors and sound governance principles. 
Applying a legal normative approach, this dissertation explores whether Namibia’s 
said PPP framework is sound and effective based on a comparative legal analysis of 
the PPP framework of South Africa, Australia as well as a case study of the Port of 
Melbourne.  
The work describes the universe of PPPs and the Blue Economy, highlights key 
development policies and best practices for successful PPPs. It also considers how best 
Namibia can use PPPs to attract private sector investment and realise its national and 




The analysis reveals that not every project is suitable for PPPs and despite the complex 
nature of PPPs, successful PPP outcomes can be maximised with the adoption of a 
multi – faceted approach, robust decision making processes, the consistent application 
of sound governance systems and involving civic society and non – state actors 
throughout the life cycle of a PPP project as well as including such actors in  
environmental and sustainability matters as part of social value creation. 
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Public – Partnerships (“PPPs”) are widely considered to be a valuable tool to stimulate 
socio – economic development (Demirag, 2011). Previous literature suggests that 
many PPPs have failed with reasons such as inefficiencies (European Court of 
Auditors, 2018), cost overruns (Bianchi, 2017) (National Treasury South Africa, nd), 
(Alonso, 2015), mismanagement and lack of sound governance principles (Xiong, 
2019) being recorded as some of the root causes. The aforesaid shortcomings 
demonstrate that the successful delivery of PPPs is typically a complex problem, 
however, PPPs have on the whole been considered successful (Sambrani, 2014).  
 
1.1.1 Blue Economy: A Global and Namibian Approach  
 
1.1.1.1 Numerous studies investigate whether PPPs are an ideal alternative to 
traditional procurement methods and the reality is that PPPs have received 
mixed reviews, being equally criticised (Osborne, 2000) and celebrated as a 
sustainable development tool (Boardmen, 2015), but despite the said reality, 
PPPs are widely known for delivering quality infrastructure, lower – cost 
services, increased efficiencies and most significantly achieving value for 
money (Schwartz, 2008). 
 
1.1.1.2 In conjunction with the continual pursuit to develop ocean economies, the 
quest for sustainable development emerged in the 1980s (Osborne, 2000) 
and the 21st century saw the incessant appeal for ocean sustainability being 
labelled as the blue economy during or about 2008 (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2016) and the last decade has seen a shift towards public 
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participation, social value creation and more attention being given to 
sustainability (Vecchi, 2019). 
 
1.1.1.3  The blue economy can loosely be defined as maximising the potential of 
oceans in a sustainable manner so as to preserve it for future generations 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016) (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2016), with the emphasis as aforesaid having shifted towards 
sustainability as compared to yesteryear economic exploitation ambitions 
that was not so much concerned with sustainability, but rather exploitation. 
 
1.1.1.4  Wenhai et al and van Wyk in their studies assert that sustainability in the 
context of the blue economy is about uplifting the socio – economic condition 
of a country (Wenhai, 2019) (van Wyk, 2015). Sanni and Hashim draw 
similar conclusions for PPP infrastructure development projects (Sanni, 
2014) and Bari and Frina in examining the opportunities and challenges of 
the blue economy emphasised the need for economic sustainable 
development (Bari, 2017). However, like many other studies on PPPs and the 
blue economy, it suffers from the limitation that human element and social 
value notions as part of good PPP governance are barely discussed in 
significant detail. 
 
1.1.1.5 The aforesaid argument is supported by Keen who rightfully criticises the 
blue economy concept for not meeting intended objectives by observing that 
the importance of multiple – actors engagement and implementation 
processes remain unclear (Keen, 2018) Soma et al in a recent study also 
recognised that “inclusion, cooperation and trust is required for long – term 
sustainable blue growth” (Soma, 2018) (Wenhai, 2019), which notions will 





1.1.1.6  From a commerce and trade perspective, blue economy sectors embraces the 
full maritime value chain (Voyer, 2019) and is relevant to all countries 
globally (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018), 
which without limitation includes, port infrastructure, maritime transport and 
services, shipbuilding and repairs as well as the cruise industry (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2006).  
 
1.1.1.7 It must be stressed that Namibia already has an established ocean economy 
(Remmert, 2018) with many other resources and markets remaining largely 
unexplored (Remmert, 2018). There has not been much private sector 
engagement in Namibia in the said sectors, with the exception of the fisheries 
industry that is highly regulated and well managed albeit some challenges 
remaining unaddressed (Chiripanhura, 2016). 
 
1.1.1.8 To further authenticate what is recorded in paragraph 1.1.1.7 above, Figure 1 
below represents the components and sub – sectors of the Namibian blue 
economy. As will be seen therefrom, port infrastructure and services are well 
established with the most mature industries in Namibia including fisheries, 
shipping, tourism and energy (Remmert, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 1: Components of the Blue Economy (Remmert, 2018) 
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1.1.1.9  One of the four different competing narratives that are presently shaping the 
debate on the blue economy globally is the narrative that reaffirms the fact 
that PPPs are recognised as an essential and preferred tool to sustainably 
unlock ocean economies (Remmert, 2018). 
 
1.1.1.10  One of the gaps and shortcomings identified in Remmert’s work, is that 
according to him key players under the blue economy only include 
“businesses, multinationals, industry coalitions and governments” (Remmert, 
2018). It is not a surprise that Remmert excludes civic society1  as key actors 
and this observation ties in well with the finding that such actors are more 
often than not overlooked and/or the importance of the role of such actors are 




1.1.2 Sustainable Development Goals under the vista of PPPs 
 
 
1.1.2.1  Globally speaking, Goal 17 of the United Nations (“UN”) Agenda for 
Sustainable Development relates to Partnership for all the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the United Nations (“SDGs”)2.  
 
1.1.2.2 Target 17 of Goal 17 explicitly “encourages and promotes public, public – 
private and civic society partnerships, building on the experience and 
resourcing strategies of partnerships” (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2019), which target amongst other SDGs to be discussed 
later on in this dissertation, are directly linked to sustainability and 
development.  
                                                 
1 Civic society in this dissertation is used to denote all non – state actors such as the public, community individual and groups and corporation 
representing them or their own interests. 
2 Goal 17 of the UN SDG’s is “Partnership for the Goals”, which relates to strengthening the means of implementation and revitalises the global 
partnership of sustainable development. 
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1.1.2.3 On reflection of target 17 of goal 17, it reasserts the value and benefits that 
can flow from using PPPs as a vehicle to develop key and quality 
infrastructure in the race for a prosperous economy. More significantly the 
said goal recognises the role that civic society play in PPPs which 
undoubtedly is a key governance requirement for successful PPPs (Singh, 
2016), the latter being one of the centerpieces of this dissertation. 
 
1.1.2.4 This dissertation in part intends to investigate how best Namibia can use PPPs 
to deliver the much needed port development infrastructure and attract private 
sector investment as part of Namibia’s prosperity, development and 
technological strategies. 
 
1.1.3 The Role of Ports and Port Development 
 
 
1.1.3.1 It is widely accepted that seaborne trade is in the region of 90%, (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018) and Africa’s import 
and exports following an almost identical trend (Sagga, 2017).  
 
1.1.3.2 Ports are crucial links to the global maritime transportation value chain 
(Dwarakish, 2015) (Brooks, 2007)  (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2017). Recent years have seen a surge in port development 
projects globally (Montwill, 2014), as many states have commenced or intend 
to fast track the development of their port infrastructure and/or improve 
existing infrastructure as part of remaining relevant on the one hand and on 
the other realising their national development, strategic and logistics hub 
goals.  
 
1.1.3.3 In readiness to become the preferred sea hub port in Southern Africa and as 
part of investing ahead of expected demand, Namibia through its Ports 
Authority undertook an expansion of its existing port facility at the Port of 
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Walvis Bay, which despite unforeseen and force majeure delays was 
commissioned on 26 August 20193.  
 
1.1.3.4 The below Figure 2 is an artistic impression of one of Namibia’s strategic 
future port facility projects to be spearheaded by the Namibian Ports 
Authority (“Namport”), measuring 13,300 hectares of land4 and has been 
valued at NAD 60 billion (or 39 billion USD5). 
 
 1.1.3.5 The said port to be developed North of Walvis Bay will be a multi – purpose 
bulk port with mainly bulk cargoes handling, including oil and gas dry and 
liquid bulk (Namibian Ports Authority, nd). A mere glimpse of Figure 2 
illustrates the magnitude of the investments that will be required and reasserts 
the need for Namport to partner with private financiers for the development 




Figure 2: Future Port of Walvis Bay Terminal                             
(Namibian Ports Authority, nd) 
 
                                                 
3 Delays experienced were mainly being beyond the control of the Namibian Ports Authority. 
4 The construction of a new tanker jetty facility by the Namibian Government on this port land and valued at approximately USD 370 million was 
also embarked on. 
5 In 2019 United States Dollars. 
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1.4.1 Definition and Development of PPPs: A Global and Namibian Approach  
 
 
1.1.4.1  In turning to deal with the issue of PPPs, many scholars have maintained that 
the main purpose of PPPs is to drive infrastructure development (Wenhai, 
2019) (Osborne, 2000) and it therefore follows that any legal framework 
regulating PPPs should be aligned to that objective, which view was echoed 
by the World Bank (World Bank, nd). 
 
1.1.4.2 In relying on the World Bank’s description of a PPP framework, it refers to 
the “policy procedures, institutions, and rules that together define how PPPs 
will be implemented, more particularly that is, how they will be identified, 
assessed, selected, budgeted for, procured, monitored and accounted for” 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank 
Group, 2017).  
 
1.1.4.3 From a PPP policy agenda point of view, the Namibian Government 
confirmed that it wants to focus on PPPs “as a means to deliver improved 
services and better value for money through appropriate risk transfer, 
innovation, asset utilisation and integrated project – life management, 
underpinned by private financing” (Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
nd). 
 
1.1.4.4 An important element of a PPP framework are the definitions and having 
considered some authoritative views on what constitutes a PPP or PPP 
project, the following synthesised elements emerged from existing literature. 
 
1.1.4.4.1 public sector and private sector partner by concluding a PPP 
contract6 (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ The World Bank Group, 2017);  
                                                 
6 To achieve an identified goal agreed to such an infrastructure project or public  service delivery. 
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1.1.4.4.2 the parties agree on who is best placed to take on and manage 
risks so identified or anticipated7 (Service Works Global, nd), and 
 
1.1.4.4.3 agree on what the profit – sharing margins will be (Osborne, 
2000). 
 
1.1.4.5 The legislative definition of a PPP in Namibia is: 
 
“an agreement between a public entity and a private entity, in terms of which 
the private entity provides public infrastructure assets or services for use, 
either directly or indirectly, by the public; investments are made by or 
management of the infrastructure asset or service is undertaken by the private 
entity for a specified time; risk is optimally shared between the private entity 
and the public entity; and the private entity receives performance linked 
payments” (Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, n.d.) (Namibian 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, nd). 
 
1.1.4.6 Most literature consulted confirms that there is not one universally accepted 
definition of what constitutes a PPP (Osborne, 2000) (Arimoro, 2018), as 
PPPs have different “institutional arrangements and conceptual 
understandings” (Medda, 2013) (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2019). For the said reasons, one finds numerous definitions of 
what actually constitutes PPPs (Marsilio, 2011), which differs from one 
jurisdiction to another.  
 
1.1.4.7 As previously mentioned, various studies have successfully demonstrated 
that PPPs do not always deliver infrastructure faster compared to traditional 
procurement methods or results in cost savings or value for money (O'Shea, 
2018).  
 
                                                 
7 Risks transferred to a private party normally include technical, financial and operational risks, but ultimately risk allocation will be negotiated by 
the parties with every PPP contract concluded. 
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1.1.4.8  A similar pattern of results was obtained by Petersen who, in recognising the 
limitation of empirical evaluations, opined that international PPPs are 
typically more costly and provide almost the same value for money as 
compared to traditional procurement methods (Petersen, 2019) 
  
1.1.4.9 Albeit a great number of authors discussing failed PPPs (World Bank, 2015), 
more and more the world over governments have continued to call upon PPPs 
for the development of infrastructure (Garg, 2016) (Roehrich, 2014) and in 
turn its economies (Economic Commission for Africa, n.d.) 
 
1.1.4.10 PPPs should not necessarily be about speed, be cost driven or because private 
sector financiers have the potential to provide cushioning for recurring budget 
deficits and budget containment measures. However, the Namibian 
Government can with successful PPPs instead focus on the myriad of issues 
on its policy agenda, other national strategies and maximise private sector 
investments that brings with it the much needed technical expertise and skills 
transfer to locals (Arimoro, 2018). 
 
1.1.4.11 From a cost – benefit analysis and value for money standpoint, PPPs will 
allow Namibia the opportunity of opening markets that would otherwise not 
be accessible in the port sector, but most importantly the benefits of PPPs can 
be invaluable for civic society and truly uplift a nation and her people (Singh, 












1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
1.2.1  It has been observed that critical success factors for PPPs and involvement of 
civic society and non – state actors have not been extensively tested under a 
critical lens in Namibia. Accordingly, this dissertation intends to add to that 
body of knowledge by carrying out an examination of the adequacy or 
otherwise of Namibia’s PPP framework for the envisaged medium to long – 
term port development projects of Namibia. 
 
1.2.2 Furthermore, other than identifying limitations and shortcomings in Namibia’s 
PPP framework, this research will recommend how best to attract and retain 
PPP private sector investments through good governance practices based on 
the comparative legal analysis alluded to hereinbelow. 
 




1.3.1.1 The research topic is worthy of investigation because it has a direct 
impact on the socio – economic growth and development of 
Namibia. It is therefore essential that Namibia succeeds in 
sustainably unlocking the port development leg of its blue economy 
ambitions, which it is believed can be achieved with a robust PPP 
framework and through consistent application of good PPP 
governance principles and PPP best practices. 
 
1.3.1.2 Most of the academic literature available on PPPs focuses on 
economic and administrative components of PPPs (Diaz, 2012) 
(Grimsey, 2004) and for the most part does not focus on one of the 
main drivers of PPPs, which is to improve the quality of lives of 
citizenry.   
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1.3.1.3 Given issues such as cost overruns (Shimete, 2017), lack of skills, 
resources, budgetary constraints and mismanagement many key 
development projects have either been shelved, delayed or put on the 
back burner (The Namibian, 2015). The aforesaid state of affairs 
provides scope and opportunities for the Namibian government 
through public bodies such as Namport to partner with private 
entities in order to address development gaps.  
 
1.3.1.4 In view of the fact that PPPs in Namibia is an academic area that 
remains largely unexplored due to its PPP framework being in its 
infancy stages reaffirms the need for research to be conducted on 
Namibia’s PPP framework in relation to port development projects 
and ultimately any blue economy project embarked upon by the 
Namibian Government. 
 
1.3.1.5 The main justification for selecting South Africa and Australia for 
comparative purposes is for the following reasons: 
 
1.3.1.5.1 South Africa: 
 
1.3.1.5.1.1  is one of the most developed maritime 
nations in Africa (van Wyk, 2015); 
 






1.3.1.5.1.3 in formulating its framework took its 
unique circumstances into consideration8 
(Bruchez, 2014), which  circumstances are 
similar to that of Namibia (Arimoro, 2018); 
 
1.3.1.5.1.4 is at a very advantaged stage in its PPP 
journey (Arimoro, 2018), as compared to 
many other African states that share the 
similar socio – economic conditions to that 
of Namibia, and 
 
1.3.1.5.1.5 is known for having good quality available 
data (Kodongo, 2016) and has over twenty 
years of PPP experience and practice 




1.3.1.5.2.1 is a developed country with a very mature, 
advanced and sophisticated PPP market 
(KPMG, 2015) (Yescombe, 2007);  
 
1.3.1.5.2.2 has recorded a myriad of successful PPP 
projects compared to other countries 
(Bianchi, 2017) in its thirty plus years of 
PPP experience (Wernek, 2015), and 
 
1.3.1.5.2.3 is known to have a very transparent 
reporting and governance system in place 
(Sharp, 2005). 
                                                 
8 Circumstances stemming from the then apartheid rule, which led to historically disadvantaged citizens. 
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1.3.2  Aims and Objectives 
 
1.3.2.1 The overall objective of this research is to critically analyse the 
adequacy of Namibia’s current PPP framework as well as to 
highlight and make recommendations for Namibia based on the said 
analysis in order to maximise successful PPP outcomes under the 
port development leg of the Namibian blue economy. 
 
1.3.2.2 As far as writer hereof is aware, no study to date has examined the 
PPP framework of Namibia on a legal normative basis and this 
research is aimed at closing that gap. To illuminate this unchartered 
area, the purpose and foundation of this research includes making 
recommendations on what critical success factors, best practices and 
key governance principles Namibia can apply in maximising 
successful PPP outcomes. 
 
1.3.3  Limitations of this Study 
 
One of the limitations identified is that the literature was limited to the publicly 
available information on PPPs. Be that as it may, every effort has been made 
to obtain a global representation of literature and the research methodology in 
this study is tailored to utilise the available data to effectively address the 









1.4 Research Questions and Methodology  
 
 
1.4.1 The following questions will guide this research: 
 
1.4.1.1    What are the key differences in the PPP framework of South Africa 
and Australia in comparison to Namibia? 
 
1.4.1.2 Is Namibia’s current PPP framework and other relevant legislation 
considered adequate to response to Namibia’s port development 
needs? 
 
1.4.1.3 To what extent do sound governance requirements consider social 
value creation and the involvement of civic society in the 
environmental management of PPPs; 
 
1.4.1.4 Is there a need for a review of the current legislative and regulatory 
PPP framework of Namibia based on the comparative legal analysis 
of South Africa and Australia and the Port of Melbourne (“PoM”) 
case study?  
 
1.4.1.5 what are the critical success factors and good governance principles 
for maximising successful Namibian port development PPP 




1.4.2 Research Methodology  
1.4.2.1 This dissertation utilises the legal normative method of research, 
which is deemed appropriate for this dissertation.  
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1.4.2.2 Considerable literature is available on the various PPP frameworks, 
but the literature for Namibia was very limited  and/or generally not 
considered very effective in identifying pitfalls, shortcomings and 
critical success factors for successful PPP outcomes. 
 
1.4.2.3 In order to fulfil the aim of this dissertation, the research was solely 
based on the analysis of secondary data obtained from journals, 
published research, text books, internet materials, media reports, 
existing literature from scholars and experts in the field, papers 
delivered at conferences or seminars, which research methodology 
approach is deemed appropriate to achieve the objectives of this 
research. 
 
Chapter 1.5 Dissertation Outline 
 
1.5.1 This dissertation consists of the following chapters:  
 
1.5.1.1 Chapter 2 provides an overview of PPPs, the blue economy, other 
key concepts such as Namibia’s economic outlook as well as the 
PPP, port, environmental legislative and regulatory framework in 
Namibia; 
 
1.5.1.2 Chapter 3 will draw comparisons and/or similarities between the 
PPP framework of South Africa and Australia, as compared to 
Namibia, as well as provide critical success factors and 




1.5.1.3  Chapter 4 will focus on a case study of the PoM lease and draw good 
governance lessons and experiences therefrom that Namibia can 
learn from; 
 
1.5.1.4 Finally, conclusions, key findings, recommendations and further 



























Chapter 2 PPPs and Blue Economy Drivers  
 
 
As part of setting the tone for the comparative legal analysis that subsequently follows 
in Chapter 3 and 4, this Chapter 2 will, amongst others, feature policy decisions that 
drove the establishment of Namibia’s PPP framework, provide a brief overview of the 
global PPP and blue economy universe as well as a succinct overview of Namibia’s 
PPP and other legal machinery. 
 
2.1 Namibia: Connecting the Dots through Policies  
 
2.1.1 Namibia is very well located geographically and from a commerce 
perspective has direct corridors to South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
2.1.2 Despite being a modest economy in comparison to other bigger Africa 
economies (International Monetary Fund, 2019) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2016), it is considered to be a gateway to South African Development 
Community (“SADC”) countries and key maritime trade routes such Europe, 
Asia, the Americas and other key international maritime transport routes 
(Namibian Ports Authority, 2018).  
 
2.1.3 At an African continental and regional integration level, more particularly, as 
a member of the African Union (“AU”), Namibia has endorsed numerous 
strategies on the AU’s policy agenda, the most notable for purposes hereof 
being the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (“AIMS 2050”). 
 
2.1.4 AIMS 2050 has as its vision to “foster increased wealth creation from Africa’s 
oceans and seas by developing a sustainable thriving blue economy in a secure 
and environmentally sustainable manner” (African Union, 2012).  
 
 18
2.1.5 Another key policy document is Agenda 63 of the AU, which has been coined 
as Africa’s blueprint and strategy for sustainable development (Africa Union, 
2019). This strategic proposal has a direct linkage to and relationship with all 
seventeen SDGs of the United Nations (“UN”) (Africa Union, 2019), which 
includes SDG 17 and SDG 14. The latter SDG effectively being a ‘blue 
economy’ goal, because it relates to conserving and sustainably using the seas 
and marine resources for sustainable development (United Nations, 2019). 
 
2.1.6 Namibia’s Vision 2030, which is akin to the AU’s Agenda 63, has it purpose 
economic emancipation and the improvement of the quality of life of all 
Namibians (Namibia Planning Commission, nd). It is similarly closely linked 
to the SDGs and recognises that the blue economy will not only bolster, 
transform, and develop the maritime transport and shipping industry in 
Namibia, but all the available and untapped resources that the ocean economy 
of Namibia has to offer (Remmert, 2018).  
 
2.1.7 Since the crafting of Vision 2030, Namibia has developed five National 
Development Plans (“NDPs”) as part of implementing the objectives set out in 
its Vision 2030 agenda, with the last two NDPs, being number 4 (Bank of 
Namibia, 2014) and number 5 respectively9.  
 
2.1.8 Most of the intended NDPs desired outcomes and targets of NDPs have not 
been realised and deferred to later dates with the most prominent justifications 
including budgetary and capacity constraints (Office of the President of 






                                                 
9 Commonly known in Namibia as NDP4 and NDP 5. 
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2.1.9 The gravamen of NDP5, amongst others, is economic progression and 
sustainable environment with various desired strategic outcomes including the 
implementation of a blue economy governance and management system by 
202210 (Government of the Republic of Namibia) (Remmert, 2018). 
 
2.1.10 One of the concerns identified on the perusal of the NDP5 implementation plan 
(National Planning Commission of Namibia, 2018) is that it hardly makes 
mention of specific pipeline or planned projects in connection with sustainable 
development, environmental management or the blue economy (National 
Planning Commission of Namibia, nd), albeit same being directly hinged to the 
blue economy. 
 
2.1.11 The said excluded critical information should have been included to whet the 
appetite of any potential private investors looking to invest in Namibia and to 
disclose as part of transparency reporting for stakeholders and civic society. 
 
2.1.12 One of the most recent and well received accelerated development programmes 
of the Namibian Government is the Harambee Prosperity Plan (“HPP”) with 
its five pillars including effective governance, economic advancement, 
infrastructure development and international relations and co – operation.  
 
2.1.13 According to the most recent HPP Progress Report, projects appears to be on 
track for the most part albeit some delays and due to budgetary controls 
development projects will have to be reassessed and/or downscaled (Office of 
the President of Namibia, 2019). The aforesaid report is a possible confound 
because with the greatest of respect, if projects under both the HPP and NDPs 
were on track they would have been rolled out as planned, but clearly that is 
not the case. 
 
                                                 
10 That sustainably maximises economic benefits from marine resources and ensures equitable marine wealth distribution for all Namibians. 
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2.1.14 In considering all other associated policies of the Namibian Government, it is 
clear that the PPP and blue economy drive is undoubtedly part of the 
development strategy of the Namibian Government, but the reality is that the 
available financial resources are simply insufficient to follow through on all 
envisaged projects (Office of the President of Namibia, 2019) (National 
Planning Commission of Namibia, nd) under NDPs and HPP. 
 
2.2 Economic Strengths and Weaknesses of Namibia  
 
2.2.1 Other than what was mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, understanding the 
economic strengths and weaknesses of Namibia is an essential component 
against the backdrop of the development strategies of the Namibian 
Government. 
 
2.2.2 Namibia has a very strong transport and logistics system and trade facilitation 
network developed in parallel with the Namibian Government (Walvis Bay 
Corridor Group, 2019) and key facilitators such as Namport and the Walvis 
Bay Corridor Group vigorously market and promote Namibia for transport and 
trade prospects, infrastructure development opportunities and trade facilitation 
whether directly or indirectly (Walvis Bay Corridor Group, 2019). 
 
2.2.3 The United States Agency for International Development quite concisely 
highlighted Namibia’s strengths (United States Agency for International 




Figure 3: Namibia’s Strengths for Economic Trade and Benefits 
 (United States Agency for International Development, 2019) 
  
2.2.4 One of the main reasons for highlighting the strengths in paragraph 2.2.3 above 
is because it reaffirms that ports are key strategic assets for Namibia and in fact 
all other strengths referred to therein impact the port business either directly 
and/or indirectly.  
 
2.2.5 From a weakness’s standpoint, despite having experienced strong and stable 
economic growth, there has been an obvious slowdown in the Namibian 
economy (Ministry of Finance Namibia, 2019) and despite numerous 
interventions and initiatives by the Namibian Government, there are fiscal 
budgetary constraints to fund large capital projects linked to national 
development goals and growth strategies (International Monetary Fund, 2018).  
 
2.2.6 Kodongo and Ojah in their examination of linkages between infrastructure and 
economic growth concluded that economic growth is directly linked to quality 
infrastructure and suggested that infrastructure gaps for economic growth and 
development must be carefully nuanced (Kodongo, 2016).  
 
2.2.7 The very low levels, if not, negligible foreign direct investment in Namibia as 
reported on by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in its 
World Investment Report of 2018 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Development, 2018) is a cause for concern, as it has a direct impact on 
Namibia’s economic growth and development potential. 
 
2.2.8 Namibia has in addition to the above experienced a slowdown in economic 
activity and the continued negative fiscal deficit or economic blows 
experienced may further erode Namibia’s economic outlook (Ministry of 
Finance Namibia, 2019). The reality is that similar curtailed budget are seen in 
many developing countries and emerging economies (World Bank, 2018), 
which in turn gives impetus for private sector investment and PPPs,  
 
2.2.9 What research has illuminated is that the path to development envisaged by 
Namibia’s Vision 2030 largely depends on private sector investment (Connoy, 
2011), but guaranteeing policy and legal certainty (Reyes-Tagle, 2018) (Prais, 
2019) is an equally important factor to incentivise private sector investments 
(Reyes-Tagle, 2018). 
 
2.2.10 Taking into account the time it takes to recover from an economic slowdown, 
is all the more reason for Namibia to ensure that its PPP framework is an 
enabler that stimulates the Namibian economy through mega port and 
infrastructure development projects (Saussier, 2015) (Nazemzadeh, 2012) by 
securing the much needed private sector investments. 
  
2.3  Public Private Partnerships : An Overview  
 
 
2.3.1 The SADC region comprises of sixteen countries in the Southern part of Africa 
of which Namibia is a part (SADC, 2019), and all of whom, like other countries 
globally are pursuing, inter alia, their development and economic progression 
agendas11 (Sustainability, 2019), which includes fast tracking their port 
development and other blue economy projects. 
                                                 
11 As well as broadly speaking, peace, security and regional integration. 
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2.3.2 As ambitious and genuine as PPPs and infrastructure development project 
agendas may be, the reality is that port development and infrastructure projects 
expenditure from a global perspective have in most cases simply been too 
exorbitant for either port authorities themselves or their governments12 to 
solely carry on their balance sheets as – it – were (Osei-Kyei, 2015) (Osborne, 
2000). 
 
2.3.3 Taking into account the heavy investment requirements for port development, 
the need to secure investments from the private sector was identified (Shaik, 
2011) and as is the case in Namibia (in parallel with the rest of the world) PPP 
policies and in turn laws have since been developed, passed and in some cases 
enforced. 
 
2.3.4 There are a myriad of factors and key drivers (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 2019) (World Bank Group, 2015)  (Osborne, 2000) 
to be taken into account and considered as part of ensuring the success of PPPs. 
More particularly,  in understanding the PPP landscape, it is important to take 
into account a list of possible advantages and disadvantages of PPP projects, 
which are synthesised in Table 1 hereunder.  
 
                                                 
12 In most cases as main shareholder, not all. 
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Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Public – Private Partnerships                         
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International 
Transport Forum, 2013) (Pârvu, 2009) 
 
 
2.3.5 Other advantages and disadvantages of PPPs are listed in Table 2 below. 
 
 




2.3.6 Mindful of the fact that advantages and disadvantages may differ depending on 
the PPP model, design, structure and financing model selected by the 
contracting parties, what Table 1 and 2 reiterates is that PPPs are complex 
ventures (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019), 
requires long term capital investments (Brooks, 2007) (Meersman, 2014) and 
a sound PPP framework and governance structure must be in place to spark 
private sector’s appetite for investment in the development of port 
infrastructure and services. Of particular note is the recognition that PPPs are 
not suitable for all types of projects. 
 
 
2.4 Namibia’s PPP Framework and Namport’s PPP Readiness 
 
PPPs have been deemed to be pivotal to the development of a country like 
Namibia as cemented and confirmed by the Namibian Government’s policy on 
PPPs (Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry, nd), which policy has since 
been translated into legislation and operationalised. 
 
2.4.1 Namibian PPP Policy 
 
2.4.1.1  During the period between 2009 and 2010, the Namibian Government 
embarked on a consultative PPP scoping study, which policy ultimately 
formed the design for Namibia’s PPP legislation.  
 
2.4.1.2 The Government of Namibia in its PPP Policy confirms that: 
 
“using PPPs as an approach to project development in Namibia can offer a 
dynamic and efficient way to deliver and manage infrastructure and project 
development….to support the country’s economic and social development 
towards ensuring modern services, economic equality, improved standards of 
living and reduced poverty” (Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry, nd). 
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2.4.2 Namibian PPP Act 
 
2.4.2.1 Approximately eight years later after the drafting of the Namibia PPP Policy, 
the Namibian Public Private Partnership No. 4 of 2017 (“PPP Act”) came into 
operation on 1 December 2018. 
 
2.4.2.2 The objects of the PPP Act set out in section 2 thereof appears to be aligned 
to the general purposes of PPPs (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ The World Bank Group, 2017), which includes oversight and 
governance of PPP projects, adequate institutional capacity for regulating 
PPPs, developing guiding procedures throughout the lifecycle of PPPs and 
the promotion of private sector participation in public services. 
 
2.4.2.3 The Namibian PPP Act was operationalised on 18 December 2018, being the 
date that the Regulations thereto were published in the Namibian Government 
Gazette (Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, 2018), which 
Regulations were quite terse and quite disappointing because it mainly deals 
with the PPP administration and procurement processes (Government Gazette 
of the Republic of Namibia, 2018) and not much is said about the actual 
governance and management of PPPs. 
 
2.4.3 Namibian Ports Authority Act 
 
2.4.3.1 Namport who is at the helm of port development in Namibia, is a public body 
established and registered as a body corporate in terms of its enabling 
legislation the Namibian Ports Authority Act No. 2 of 1994, as amended 




2.4.3.2 As the national port authority and regulator, Namport has a core mandate to 
manage and control all the ports in Namibia13 and it does so in terms of the 
objects of its enabling legislation, being section 3(1) of its enabling legislation 
that requires Namport to provide facilities and services normally related to a 
functioning of a port and to conduct its business in accordance with sound 
and generally accepted business practices. 
 
2.4.3.3 Namport is further subject to the obligation14 to conduct and operate its 
business so as to ensure that the maximum usage of the said facilities and 
services at competitive process that will yield a profit15 to it. 
 
2.4.3.4 An important point to mention is that the Government has alongside Namport 
entered into bilateral agreements with surrounding landlinked countries 
Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The said countries have dry ports within 
the Port of Walvis Bay, which is certainly an added strategic advantage for 
Namibia and once fully operational will positively contribute to an increase 
in the overall throughput volumes of Namibian ports. 
 
2.4.4 Namport’s PPP Readiness  
 
2.4.4.1 The Namport Act and South Africa’s National Port Authority Act 
(“SANPAA”) are similar in many respects. Be that as it may, one of the main 
dichotomies  is that section 56(1) of SANPAA expressly makes provision for 
PPPs and gives South Africa’s National Port Authority, namely Transnet 
National Port Authority (“TNPA”), the right “to contract with private terminal 
operators to design, build, rehabilitate, develop, finance, maintain and 
operate port terminals or facilities”.  
 
                                                 
13 Section 3(1) of the Namport Act. 
14 Except where otherwise required in national interest. 
15 Fair and responsible profits. 
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2.4.4.2 In contrast, the Namport Act does not have a similar provision. What the 
Namport Act does have is a cloudy provision under section 19 that allows 
Namport to conclude a contract with any person or entity to render a particular 
service for or on behalf of Namport as long as it is not inconsistent with the 
objects of the Namport Act. The SANPAA has an almost identical provision 
under section 56(4)16. 
 
2.4.4.3 No information on the rationale of section 19 could be found, but in reading the 
Namport Act as a whole, it is safe to assume that it relates to outsourcing of 
services in the normal course of port business such as stevedoring, security and 
waste removal services. 
 
2.4.4.4 In considering the rules of statutory interpretation in interpreting section 19, it 
is not clear whether a PPP qualifies as acting for and on behalf of Namport 
and/or meets the objects of the Namport Act.  
 
2.4.4.5 Extending the Namport Act to include PPPs as defined in the PPP Act alluded 
to hereinabove, may be stretching it on the thin edges of the law, simply because 
section 19 seems to be open to interpretation and/or misconstruction.  
 
2.4.4.6 Given the possible limitations and uncertainty of section 19, there is quite 
clearly a need for an express and “avoidance of doubt” section along the lines 
of the South African section 56 provision.  If regard is had to concession trends 
in ports worldwide (Monias, 2015), the Namport Act must be aligned to current 
realities seen in port reform in recent years, mindful that no comprehensive 
review of the Act was done since the Namport Act entered into force. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Section 56(4) states that “the Authority may enter into agreements in terms of which it contracts out any service which the Authority is required 
to provide in terms of this Act.” 
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2.4.4.7 It is important to underscore that PPPs cannot be treated as a one size fits all 
approach and many other factors, moreso sector specific conditions and 
dynamics will need to be considered when evaluating whether designated port 
development projects should be subject to Namibia’s PPP framework because 
PPPs are not suitable for all types of projects (Krawchenko, 2011). 
  
2.5 Namibia’s Economic Outlook  
 
2.5.1 Albeit the ambitions of the Namibian Government to use PPPs as the golden 
key to unlock Namibian sustainable development door, it is important to have 
regard to an independent assessment of Namibia’s economic outlook.  
 
2.5.2 Reports on Namibia’s infrastructure – to – GDP ratio is indicative of the fact 
that a boost in infrastructure investment is required to bolster the economic 
growth of Namibia (Bank of Namibia, 2014), which view is further amplified 
by the fiscal deficit concerns raised by the Ministry of Finance in it tabled 
2019/20 budget (Ministry of Finance Namibia, 2019). 
 
2.5.3 The African Development Bank, from an economic viewpoint reaffirmed the 
aforesaid position and reported that the “Namibian Government, as part of its 
fiscal and debt sustainability aims to lower its fiscal deficit to 2.7% GDP by 
2022” (African Development Bank, 2019), which plan to be implemented will 
include, inter alia,  the promotion of PPP’s for envisaged infrastructure 
developments. 
 
2.5.4 To further reinforce what is recorded in the above paragraph 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, 
Reuters advised that according to the Bank of Namibia, the economic growth 
of Namibia will be led by transport and construction (Reuters, n.d.) and Fitch 
Ratings also referenced future development factors that can result in Namibia’s 
outlook being either upgraded or downgraded (Fitch Ratings, 2017).  
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2.5.5 As much as the factors mentioned above may positively or negatively impact 
Namibia’s economic outlook, there are certainly many other factors, too many 
to mention here, that may have a bearing thereon and/or that may not have been 
taken into account when the above assumptions were made. 
 
2.5.6 There are many variables, including social and political issues, that may impact 
Namibia’s economic progression and by extension its port development 
projects. It is therefore critical that: 
 
2.5.6.1 structures and clear governance criteria must be put in place to not 
only attract and retain (Beuve, 2018) (Grimsey, 2004) the much 
needed investments (World Bank, 2009) into Namibia, but also absorb 
or set off any unexpected market or economic shocks, and 
 
2.5.6.2 policy and legal certainty (Reyes-Tagle, 2018) (Prais, 2019) (as 
previously highlighted) be provided through sound legislative, 
regulatory and governance frameworks for PPPs as part of baiting 
and/or boosting private investor appetite for port development 
projects. 
 
2.5.7 As previously emphasised, private sector investment and partnership is 
fundamental to Namibia’s socio – economic development plans and in that 
regard specific reference is made to the Investment Promotion Act of Namibia 
No. 9 of 2016 (“IPAN”) that supports that drive, as IPAN has as its object: 
 
 “…the promotion of sustainable economic development and growth through 
the mobilisation and attraction of foreign and domestic investment17 to enhance 
economic development, reduce unemployment, accelerate growth and 
diversify the economy” (KPMG International, 2016). 
                                                 
17 Concessions and unsolicited bids are also well catered for. 
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2.5.8 According to the World Bank who carried out extensive research on private 
investment in infrastructure, some of the reasons for the possible reluctance for 
private investors to tap into the PPP markets of developing countries include 
imbalance of the risk spread, past experience, track records and lack of well – 
prepared and structured infrastructure projects (World Bank, 2018). 
 
2.5.9 One of the weaknesses of the above – mentioned World Bank Report is that it 
was based solely on the database records investment commitments for 
infrastructure projects. Additionally, it would have been more useful if 
comparisons and analogies were drawn between developed, developing and 
emerging markets to have a clearer understanding of overall private investment 
appetite and to draw out guidance on how and to what extent designated 
countries have attracted more investment than others.  
 
2.5.10 Robert and Chan provide specific solutions for enhancing private sector 
investment, which include political support and acceptability for PPPs, 
government positive attitude towards private sector investments and political 
stability as key factors (Robert, 2017).   
 
2.5.11 Another possibility to consider under Namibia’s economic outlook should the 
extended continental shelf claim of Namibia be approved by the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf18 (Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 
nd) it will more than double Namibia’s territorial jurisdiction and in turn double 
the economic opportunities and potential of  Namibia’s blue economy (van 
Wyk, 2015).  
 
 
                                                 
18 Namibia in short submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shel and application to extend the limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
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2.5.12 Despite all that potential port development and blue economy growth potential, 
the fiscal evidence alluded to hereinabove supports the view that Namibia will 
clearly not be able to unlock those huge investments on its own balance sheet 
whether or not the budget deficit issue is resolved, which further justifies 
pursuing PPP as a viable option to so do. 
 
2.6 PPPs Rationale and Types : A Global and Namibian Approach  
 
 
2.6.1  Since the emergence of PPPs more than two decades ago, the rationale for PPPs 
included the belief in short that infrastructure gaps (Bruchez, 2014) will be 
closed by partnering with private entities and using their expertise, funding, 
technology and other contemporary approaches to improve public service 
delivery, infrastructure and operational efficiencies (World Bank Group, 2015) 
(Osborne, 2000). 
 
2.6.2 Other than the foregoing observations, having a general understanding of the 
different types, variations, models, forms and, contracts of PPPs is also 










Figure 5: Continuum of private sector involvement in PPPs  
(National Conference of State Legislature, 2017)  
 
2.6.3  The PPPs referred to in Figure 4 and 5 hereinabove above are of course very 
broad categories of the most common PPP forms contracts, types, variations 
and models (Farrell, 2010). Nevertheless, every PPP contract concluded will 
most certainly be sui generis with the extent of private sector participation 
varying to different degrees. 
 
2.6.4 Furthermore, the design, form and structure of PPPs will depend on numerous 
variables, but one commonality that every PPP model listed in the figures 
above have in common is that it moves far beyond institutional capacity, but 
requires, management, evaluation and monitoring at all stages of the PPP 





2.6.5 Having had regard to PPPs internationally, it is important to consider what 
PPP forms and/or contracts are envisaged for Namibia. As will be seen from 
the below it is closely aligned to the most common PPP forms and types found 
internationally (Higuchi, 2019) (Yescombe, 2007) and as highlighted in 
Figure 4 and 5 above.  
 
 2.6.5.1     Service, maintenance and/or management contracts; 
2.6.5.2     Leases; 
2.6.5.3     Build – Lease – Transfer (BLT); 
2.6.5.4     Build – Transfer – Lease (BTL); 
2.6.5.5     Build – Operate – Transfer Annuity (BOT); 
2.6.5.6     Design – Build – Finance – Operate – Transfer (DBFOT); 
2.6.5.7     Build – Own – Operate – Transfer (BOOT); 
2.6.5.8     Build – Own – Operate (BOO), and 
2.6.5.9     any other PPP form approved by the portfolio Ministry for PPPs. 
 
2.6.6  It needs be mentioned that PPPs should not be confused with Government’s 
business as usual collaboration with private entities. It must especially be 
understood that a project, activity or the like will only be regarded  as a PPP if 
it meets the statutory or equivalent definition so in cases where it does not an 
agreement or arrangement cannot be said to be a PPP (Arimoro, 2018) 
 
2.6.7 Other than the form of PPPs, the most important and often overlooked factor 
as mentioned hereinabove is the human element or role of civic society. 
Stakeholders have a central role to play in PPPs (Howard, 2018) (Bull, 2007) 
and the next section is dedicated to providing a succinct overview of relevant 





2.7 PPP Stakeholders: Namibia 
 
2.7.1 Embarking on a PPP, regardless of its form, type and variation will require 
collaboration, co – operation and engagement. As such, various actors and 
stakeholders must be considered, consulted, and where required, have a role to 
play at all PPP stages, that is, from planning, inception, feasibility study 
procurement, development/implementation to delivery/exit stage (Grimsey, 
2004). 
 
2.7.2 Following a diligent search, writer hereof could not retrieve a document 
making reference to stakeholders under the Namibian PPP framework. Albeit 
same, the following non – exhaustive list of actors and/or stakeholders19 are 
deemed relevant for Namibian PPP related projects and will be relevant to any 
port development project being undertaken on a PPP basis: 
 
2.7.2.1 Government and (portfolio and key) Ministries (e.g. labour, health, 
fisheries, environment and trade); 
2.7.2.2 parastatals/public bodies (e.g. road, rail, aviation); 
2.7.2.3 other regulators (competition, telecommunications etc.); 
2.7.2.4 maritime administrations; 
2.7.2.5 non – state actors (e.g. non – governmental organisations, 
international organisations regional organisation and media); 
2.7.2.6 trade unions; 
2.7.2.7 port users/customers; 
2.7.2.8 consultants /advisors/technocrats; 
2.7.2.9 public, civic society and the surrounding community; 
2.7.2.10 private sector; 
2.7.2.11 financiers;   
2.7.2.12 internal stakeholders such as employees, and 
2.7.2.13 specialised Government agencies. 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that the list is not in order or preference or rank. 
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2.7.3 Aerts et al made an important contribution by examining the multi – actor 
perspective on critical success factors for PPP port infrastructure, by 
highlighting the “diverging opinions of stakeholders” in relation to the 
importance of critical success factors (Aerts, 2014) and the Ocek study on 
critical success factors of PPPs suggest that having a deeper understanding of 
problems associated with PPPs is essential for overcoming same (Ocak, 
2017). 
 
 2.7.4 A number of authors have recognised that stakeholders play an indispensable 
role in ensuring the success and/or failure of PPP projects (Xiong, 2019)  
(Nederhand, 2017) so much so that many a failed PPP project has been linked 
to public opposition (Cui, 2018). The foregoing finding by Cui supports the 
argument that a failure to include, communicate to, consult and/or involve in 
civic society and key stakeholders in decision – making prior to embarking 
on a PPP venture and at all relevant stages of a PPP project may be a deal 




2.8 Sustainability and the Namibian Environmental Management Act 
 
2.8.1 Two other inseparable pillars under the blue economy is sustainability and 
environmental management, which is linked to SDG 14 as well as other SDGs 
linked to the environment, being decent and economic growth20, sustainable 
cities21 and communities, responsible consumption22climate change23and life 
on land24 (International Labour Organisation, 2019). 
 
 
                                                 
20 SDG 8 . 
21 SDG 11. 
22 SDG12. 
23 SDG 13. 
24 SDG 15. 
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2.8.2 Namibia has passed numerous legislation related to the environment, the most 
relevant for purposes hereof being the Environment Management Act No. 7 
of 2007 (“EMA”) that in short has its purposes, “to promote the sustainable 
management of the environment and the use of natural resources”.  
 
2.8.3 In addition thereto, the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
(“MET”) intends to make limited amendments to the said Act as well as issue 
revised Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations and new Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (“SEA”) Regulations, but no mention is made of 
civic society’s role or their right to access environmental information. 
 
2.8.4 The objective of the SEA Regulations is to support the overarching objective 
of the EMA and to regulate the procedures and criteria for a SEA as required 
by the EMA25. As part of monitoring and reporting requirements, Namport 
will be expected to submit bi – annual reports to MET, which compliance 
requirement will have to be built into any PPP or other contractual 
arrangements with a private investor. 
 
2.8.5 Part of optimal risks sharing is the management of environmental risks, which 
includes foreseeable and unforeseen impacts on the environment as a 
consequence of the use of the facility, service or infrastructure (Alonso, 
2015). This is an important finding by Alonso (Alonso, 2015), because it 
further supports the need for consistent and transparent public information 
sharing and multiple – actor involvement in Namibia. In fact, Namibian 
public bodies should be reporting on their compliance therewith in the report 
to MET referred to in the previous paragraph. 
 
 
2.8.6 From a global perspective, the UN has a number of international Conventions 
and Agreements that are directly pegged to the SDGs. (United Nations, nd).  
 
                                                 
25 Part VI. 
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2.8.7 In that regard, specific reference is made to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision – Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters that was signed in Aarhus on the 25th of June 1998 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Aarhus Convention”) (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 1998) and its Protocol on Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Registers, which empowers people, as part of environmental 
democracy, with “the right to access information, participate in decision 
making and to seek justice” (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, nd). 
 
2.8.8 Transparency, accountability and involving all key stakeholders in decision 
making and/or matters impacting them directly is crucial for sustainability 
and environmental management (Hueskes, 2017) (Steets, 2010).  
 
2.8.9 As much as no African country has to date ratified the Aarhus Convention, 
one cannot divorce sustainability and environmental impact issues from the 
blue economy, moreso because the African Chapter of Human and People’s 
Rights enshrined the right to “a satisfactory environment” (African 
Commission on Human and People's Rights, nd) and in the case of Namibia 
environmental sustainability is a key theme found in all Namibian NDPs. 
 
2.8.10 It is of course ideal for a country such as Namibia to ratify the Aarhus 
Convention and in doing so it will be a step close to realising its Vision 2030, 
NDPs and HPP goals, with the latter including a target for Namibia to be the 
most transparent African country. The same recommendation is made for 
South Africa. 
 
2.8.11 Taking into account the pending and long list of Conventions that have been 
ratified and yet to be implemented in Namibia it appears that Aarhus 
Convention may, in the absence of political will to fast track ratification, have 
to take a back seat for now.  
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2.8.12 It does not mean to say that Namibia must wait to ratify and adopt the Aarhus 
Convention as domestic law before applying the access, transparency, 
accountability and reporting governance requirements as contained in the 
Aarhus Convention and it is for that reason recommended that Namibia 
incorporates the said Aarhus  Convention principles into its PPP framework 
without delay. 
 
2.8.13 Moreover, if the Aarhus Convention and other key International Maritime 
Organisation and UN instruments linked to the environment and 
sustainability concepts are not ratified and enforced, then there are limits to 
enforcing such prerequisites. Further, in the absence of having mandatory 
transparency and stakeholder engagement platforms in place means 
difficulties will in all probability arise when attempts are made to implement 
such governance principles, hence the need for explicit legislative framework 
providing for same. 
 
2.8.14 Neither Namibia, South Africa or Australia (Wilson, 2012) have as at date of 
this dissertation ratified the Aarhus Convention (United Nations, 2019). 
Unlike, the two former countries, the PPP Guidelines of Australia recommend 
liaison with public interest groups and other relevant bodies that may affect 
or sway the value for money analysis (Wernek, 2015).  
 
2.8.15 One of the problems with the said Australian approach is that it is merely a 
recommendation and not a minimum compliance requirement, as it should be 








 2.9 Summary 
 
 
2.9.1  This Chapter 2 in a nutshell gives a concise overview, rationale and structure 
of different PPPs and the blue economy both globally and within the 
Namibian context. 
 
2.9.2 The study of PPPs is well documented and have been discussed by a great 
number of authors in literature, however, the majority of research and studies 
on PPPs are one – dimensional focused relate to financial (Petersen, 2019) 
(Bennett, 2006) with research on stakeholder, civic society  and social value 
aspects being scarce. Where said issues are discussed, literature pertaining to 
civic society and stakeholder collaboration seem to suggest that the low rate 
of collaborations are due to a myriad of so – called justified reasons (Rossi, 
2014). 
 
2.9.3 Sustainability dovetails into environmental management, information sharing 
and transparency. For that reason, a holistic systems and synergies approach 
is required to ensure that port development PPPs or any PPP linked to SDGs 
prosper. 
 
2.9.4 There is a dire need for more participatory and inclusive approaches for civic 
society and other key stakeholders as a critical success factor for PPP 














3.1.1 Cognisant of the differences in socio – economic conditions and financial 
positions of every country (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ The World Bank Group, 2017) and mindful of the various 
PPPs across jurisdictions, this Chapter 3 examines the PPP framework in 
South Africa and Australia in comparison to that of Namibia, as the said 
countries are known to be on the forefront of PPP infrastructure projects 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank 
Group, 2017). 
 
3.1.2 In undertaking the comparative legal analysis herein attention will be drawn 
to the lessons that Namibia can learn from South Africa and Australia as part 
of improving Namibia’s PPP framework, which includes probing into what 
the critical success factors and/or pitfalls of PPP26 projects are based on the 
experience of the said countries so far. 
 
3.1.3 As much as Namibia does not have the same PPP track record like South Africa 
and Australia that have much bigger economies (Bruchez, 2014), it is pertinent 
at the outset to mention that prior to the passing of the Namibian PPP Act the 
three below – mentioned PPP projects were concluded in Namibia with only 









3.1.4 Since the Namibian PPP Act came into operation, no PPP contract has been 
concluded to date, however, Namibian PPP projects concluded prior to the PPP 
Act being operationalised include Nampower’s27 14 5MW and one 35 MW 
independent power producer projects that were signed by NamPower, the 
Emona hostel of the University of Namibia and the Goreangab wastewater 
reclamation plant (Namibian, 2019).  
 
3.2  South Africa:  Policies, Laws and Ocean Development Strategy 
 
3.2.1 South Africa’s Operation Phakisa and  Port Development Projects  
 
 
3.2.1.1  South Africa, being one of the two largest African economies (Signé, 2018),  
is one of the few African countries that has amassed the greatest number of  
PPP projects in Africa (Shaik, 2011) and in the 2018 South African Treasury 
Budgetary review it was reported that thirty – three PPP projects was as at 
that date undertaken by South Africa since 1998 (National Treasury South 
Africa, nd) (BRICS South Africa, 2018).  
 
3.2.1.2 Operation Phakisa is South Africa’s blue economy strategy that was rolled 
out in 2014. There are eighteen development initiatives under the marine 
transport and manufacturing focus area of Operation Phakisa, of which eight 
are being spearheaded by TNPA who manages the current eight commercial 
ports in South Africa.  
 
3.2.1.3 Examples of the main strategic and prioritised projects of TNPA  include an 
oil and gas private operator concession, refurbishing existing facilities, a 
floating dock in Richards Bay and a boat building cluster in East London 
(Transnet National Port Authority, nd). 
                                                 
27 NamPower is the national power utility company of Namibia.  
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3.2.1.4 What all eight TNPA port and related development projects have in 
common is that they are very ambitious multi – billion dollar projects with 
very ambitious targets (Transnet National Ports Authority, nd) and as such 
potential PPP projects, because private sector capital will in all probability 
have to be sourced to fund the said projects.  
 
3.2.1.5 What stands out from TNPA’s blue economy drive under the aegis of 
Operation Phakisa are some of the good governance processes being 
followed by TNPA. In particular, the transparent stakeholder consultative 
and progress reporting in Operation Phakisa project updates (Transnet 
National Ports Authority, nd). 
 
3.2.1.6 It cannot be confirmed with certainty to what extent the transparency and 
accountability undertakings made by TNPA have actually been met 
implemented, but it seems that TNPA takes stakeholder relations very 
seriously. 
 
3.2.1.7 TNPA for instance successfully piloted a project known as 'relational 
proximity model’, whereby, independent interviews focused on the 
relationship with TNPA stakeholders and included answering questions 
regarding “communication, knowledge, commonality of purpose, power, 
continuity, trust and reciprocity, and a shared sense of purpose and 
values…”  (Network for Business Sustainability, nd).  
 
3.2.1.8 Additionally, when it comes to Environmental Impact Assessments 
(“EIAs”), key stakeholder sessions are held before the release of draft 
scoping reports, stakeholders are also provided with the environmental 
impact assessment reports, the public has thirty days to review the draft 
scoping reports, and focus group meetings are held in connection 
therewith  (Transnet, nd). 
 44
 
3.2.1.9 Despite the transparency and accountability approaches followed by TNPA 
on its EIAs and business as usual stakeholder engagements, the Oceans 
Economy Review Workshop of Operation Phakisa facilitated by the South 
African Maritime Institute (“SAIMI”) raised concerns regarding lack of 
communication with the private sector and communities and called for 
heightened stakeholder engagements (South African Maritime Institute, 
2016). Similar concerns were also listed in other independent reports on 
good practices for PPPs (BRICS South Africa, 2018). 
 
3.2.1.10 In order to close the governance gaps identified, outcomes from the SAIMI 
workshop included securing an effective institutional arrangement, 
speeding up policy decisions, deepened leadership involvement and 
improved access to opportunities (South African Maritime Institute, 2016).  
 
3.2.1.11  The foregoing concerns from a legal perspective justifies the importance of 
ratifying and adopting as domestic law the Aarhus Convention and other 
key accountability instruments. Similar to what was recommended for 
Namibia hereinabove, South Africa need not adopt the Aarhus Convention 
before applying access, transparency, accountability and reporting 
governance requirements and can simply include same in its PPP 
framework. 
 
3.2.1.12 Despite all the benefits that Operation Phakisa has to offer, the bottom line 
is that it was from its inception a very ambitious project and was thought to 
be a silver bullet. However, approximately fifteen years since its adoption, 







3.2.1.13 One of the main microeconomic reasons normally offered for such a 
situation is the economies of scale factor that makes doing business in Africa 
much more expensive, however, as evidenced by the SAIMI workshop from 
an external and internal stakeholder standpoint there are still numerous 
governance issues and gaps that must be addressed (South African Maritime 
Institute, 2016), which have nothing to do with the economies of scale.  
 
3.2.1.14 Further, another issue with Operation Phakisa is that its main motivation is 
economic and other than targeted increases for jobs and the normal 
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) programmes (Transnet SOC 
Group, nd) not much information on social value development or 
environmental strategies were found on the available literature, which are 
critical factors to socio – economic development other than employment 
creation (van Wyk, 2015) and CSR programmes. 
 
3.2.1.15 Sanni and Hasim conclude their examination of a case study of South Africa 
by arguing that lack of capacity, policy direction, high participation costs, 
delays in negotiation and poor performance” (Sanni, 2014) are among 
challenges facing PPPs in sub – Saharan Africa, which seems to be a 
common problem in Namibia as well (Shimete, 2017). One way to 
overcome the said challenges is the consistent application of governance 
principles developed through PPP best practices and critical success factors, 
as will be further discussed hereinbelow. 
  
3.2.1.16 Concerns such as these reveals the necessity for countries such as Namibia, 
South Africa and Australia to legislate the rights of civic society to access 
information, moreso it underpins the argument that ratification of the 
Aarhus Convention will assist not only in that regard, but will cement the 
right of all actors within the maritime and PPP value chain to be involved in 
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environmental and sustainability decision making and to seek recourse 
against public bodies that fail to comply with such requirements. 
 
3.2.2 South Africa’s PPP Framework 
 
3.2.2.1 As regards the PPP framework in South Africa, the Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999 governs PPPs. All national and provincial public 
entities in South Africa28 are subject to Regulation 16 of the South African 
Treasury Regulations, which in the main governs PPPs in South Africa29 
(National Treasury South Africa, nd). 
 
3.2.2.2 Regulation 16 of the South African Manual stipulates that a PPP in South 
Africa can only be said to exist where a private entity (Davey, 2017): 
 
3.2.2.2.1  performs an institutional function on behalf of the public 
institution; 
 
3.2.2.2.2  acquires the use of state property for its own commercial 
purposes; 
 
3.2.2.2.3 assumes substantial financial, technical and operational project 
risks in connection with the performance of the institutional 
function or the use of state property; 
 
3.2.2.2.4 receives a benefit for performing the institutional function or 
from utilising the state property. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Listed in schedule 3 of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No. 5 of 2000. 
29  Including the South African Constitution, the Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 and the Municipal Systems Act No. 44 of 
2003. 
 47
3.2.2.3 Most notably PPPs in South Africa must comply with three regulatory tests 
prior to Treasury approval of any proposed PPP being, (1) value for money, 
(2) whether the proposed project is affordable and (3) whether there is a 
transfer of project risks to the private entity (Arimoro, 2018) (National 
Treasury South Africa, nd).  
 
3.2.2.4 The aforesaid approach ties in well with the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Model Law on Public Procurement (United 
Nations Commission on International Trade, nd), but it would have been 
more interesting for South Africa to also include compliance with  
environmental, sustainability and social value requirements. 
 
3.2.2.5 Namibia’s PPP framework does not have specific regulatory tests other than 
its PPP Policy that talks about value for money, but alas the aforesaid and 
other essential governance elements were not incorporated into the 
Namibia’s PPP framework.  
 
3.2.2.6 Having compared the Namibian definition of a PPP as set out in Chapter 2 
with the South African position on PPPs, it would appear that the Namibian 
definition is somewhat rigid, as it seems to envisage very limited forms of 
PPPs albeit the Namibian PPP Policy30 mentioning a more holistic approach 
to PPPs, as mentioned in Chapter 2.    
 
3.2.2.7  It means that any port project that would otherwise be considered a PPP for 
all intents and purposes may not necessarily meet the definition of PPP as 
per Namibian legislation and would therefore have to be go through 
traditional procurement structures31, which may not be desirable because of 
the agile nature of the port business, possible red tape and undue delays that 
are customary under traditional procurement methods. 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p42. 
31 Namibian Procurement Act No. 15 of 2015. 
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3.2.2.8 From a regulator of PPPs perspective, the National Treasury in South Africa 
initiates, approves regulates and manages PPPs (National Treasury South 
Africa, nd), however, it is still unclear to what extent the PPP Unit division 
within the Namibian Ministry of Finance will regulate and monitor PPPs. 
 
3.2.2.9 One criticism of both the Namibian and South African PPP frameworks is 
that it fails to take into account all the actors involved in a PPP relationship 
(National Treasury South Africa, nd)., as no mention is made about 
engaging civic society and non – state actors  
 
3.2.2.10 Other than the South African PPP Manual32 that must be read together with 
other standardised PPP provisions33, Treasury has also catered for 
differences in relation to technical and other specifications, penalties, 
payments, risk allocations and other issues specific to the different types of 
PPP projects or PPP activities (Davey, 2017), which differences are absent 
in the Namibian PPP framework. 
 
3.2.2.11 Moreover, in stark contrast to South Africa’s PPP framework, Namibia’s 
PPP framework appears to be very generic and does not provide for detailed 
rules or guidelines on how PPP contracts will actually be carried out.  
 
3.2.2.12 It is of course appreciated that the Namibia’s PPP framework is less than a 
year old, but one would have expected some regulations, policies or 
directives being issued by either the PPP Unit or Ministry of Finance in 
Namibia since the Act came into force and it is still unclear at what point it 
will be done. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Modules relate to (1) Regulations for PPPs, (2)  Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in PPPs, (3) PPP inception, (4) PPP feasibility study, (5) 
PPP procurement, (6) managing PPP agreement, (7) auditing PPPs, (8) regulates accounting treatment for PPPs and (9) the introduction to project 
finance 
33 Practice Note Number 01 of 2004. 
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3.2.3 Empowerment Provisions: South Africa and Namibia 
  
3.2.3.1 The historical ties and social reality of Namibia and South Africa are quite 
similar and consequently so too are its socio – economic conditions, which 
includes strategies to redress inequality and discriminatory past practices by 
bridging the inequality gap for historically disadvantaged citizens. South 
Africa passed legislation to that effect (Government Gazette Republic of 
South Africa, 2004) and Namibia presently has the National Equitable 
Empowerment Policy and Bill (“NEEF”) (National Assembly Republic of 
Namibia, nd) that has received a lot of backlash and is under advisement. 
 
3.2.3.2 The South African Treasury Manual contains Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) Policy34 provisions that must be applied 
throughout the PPP cycle as well as information on  how to apply said policy 
in each phase of the PPP project cycle based on a balance scorecard.  
 
3.2.3.3 In juxtaposing, Namibia’s PPP framework does not have detailed 
empowerment provisions, save for section 25 of the PPP Act tersely 
mentioning the prerequisite that at the stage of a request for proposal, 
evaluation criteria must include a preference for the protection and 
advancement of Previously Disadvantages Namibians (PDNs) and Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).  
 
3.2.3.4 It means that the Namibian section 25 empowerment provision dealing with  
PDN evaluation criteria is left to the individual public body or government 
institution to decide on PDN and SME evaluation criteria.  
 
                                                 
34 Preferential procurement policies such as B-BBEE have been used to promote substantive equality through the application of preferential 
treatment to previously disadvantaged designated groups when awarding Government contracts. 
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3.2.3.5 Furthermore, the Regulations to the Namibian PPP Act does not contain any 
reference to so – called empowering provisions and is at best an extension 
of the procurement evaluation criteria set out in the PPP Act.  
 
3.2.3.6 Be that as it may, NEEF if passed will contain similar provisions to that of 
South Africa in that it contains clauses that facilitate PPPs in Namibia and 
criteria for designated sectors in the Namibian economy (National 
Assembly Republic of Namibia, nd).  
 
3.2.3.7 In the absence of PDN compliance and monitoring, it may expose a public 
entity to fronting and the risk of no real value being added or skills transfer 
taking place. It is therefore absolutely vital that Namibia’s PPP framework 
be aligned to the NEEF machinery. 
 
3.2.3.8 Any empowerment provisions linked to Namibian NEEF and/or PPP 
framework must, akin to South Africa contain information on how to apply 
such provisions in each phase of the PPP project cycle, moreso based on a 
balance scorecard that must be applied throughout the PPP cycle35.  
 
3.2.3.9 As a side and very important note, the Namibian PPP Act also appears to be 
silent on the issue of possible conflict of laws bearing in mind that other 
laws may possibly overlap or be in conflict with the PPP framework.  
 
3.2.3.10 It is recommended, if not done already, that further research be undertaken 
to determine whether there are any conflicts or overlaps and most 
importantly to ensure that there is a clear delineation of laws and ‘avoidance 
of doubt’ provisions contained across all interconnected Namibian laws. 
 
 
                                                 
35 A PPP life cycle phases generally consists of inception, feasibility, procurement, development, delivery and exit. 
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3.2.4 Criteria for successful PPPs: A South African Best Practices Approach 
 
3.2.4.1  Namibia cannot successfully pursue its NDPs, which includes PPPs, and its 
blue economy goals in a fragmented and piecemeal manner and an 
integrated governance and systems approach is required (National Academy 
of Sciences, 2013). 
 
3.2.4.2 At this juncture it is opportune to deal with the issue of best practices and 
critical success factors for successful PPPs.  
 
3.2.4.3 Bruchez undertook an extensive literature regarding the suitability of PPPs 
for the long – term development of infrastructure in South Africa. He 
concluded that that the criteria listed in Figure 6 below must be taken into 
account not only as part of ensuring the success of PPPs, but also as a long 
– term tool for infrastructure development in South Africa. (Bruchez, 2014), 
which serves as a good yardstick for developing a PPP critical success 





Figure 6: Criteria for successful PPPs (Bruchez, 2014) 
 
 
3.2.4.4 As succinct as the stated PPP success criteria referred to by Bruchez is, the 
importance of civic society inclusion was overlooked and excluded as a 
critical success factor.  
 
3.2.4.5 As much as most comparative studies such as the Bruchez study (Bruchez, 
2014) provides great insights, they are for the most part one – dimensional 
and focus on very specific issues, which view was also held by Beuve et al 
who dealt with theoretical and empirical developments of PPPs (Beuve, 
2018) and Roehrich et al who found that the systematic review of literature 
simultaneously dealing with policy, practice and PPP outcomes is very 




3.2.4.6 Moreover, other than the said critical success factors alluded to by Bruchez, 
what classifies a PPP as successful or unsuccessful is relative and will 
depend on the socio – political – economic and legal environment and many 
other circumstances in a country (Chou, 2015) and the Australian PPP 
framework discussed in the next section and chapter will provide further 
insights.  
 
3.3 Australia:  PPP Framework and PPP Experience 
 
3.3.1 Prior to discussing some of the PPP experiences of Australia, it is important to 
mention that Australia is a federal and state government (Wernek, 2015) 
comprising of six states each having its own Constitution and Parliament, but 
in the event of conflict of law situation, its federal legislation take precedence. 
3.3.2 Australia does not have any PPP legislation, but adopted a country wide 
approach to PPPs in 2005 through the issuance of  a PPP Policy and Guidelines 
(Wernek, 2015). The definition of PPPs has evolved in Australia since the 
concept was first introduced, with the latest definition being: 
 
 “…a proven infrastructure procurement method that in the appropriate 
circumstances can make the best use of the resources of both the public and 
private sectors” (Australian Government, 2015), which definition does not 
necessarily have to incorporate  the elements of private sector investment, risks 
transfer and the design, construction, maintenance and/or other services in 
order for a project be classified a PPP (Bianchi, 2017).  
 
3.3.3 Figure 7 below gives a snapshot of Australian PPP investments in terms of 
value and transactions for the period 2000 to present date36 (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia, 2019).  
                                                 
36 Figure 7 shows the total value and number of projects that has occurred each year, divided into jurisdictions. The column chart shows the value 
of projects against the left hand side axis and the number of projects is shown using the dotted line which refers to the right hand side axis. All 
project values are in constant prices (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2019). 
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Figure 7: Market Analysis based on volume and value of PPPs per year in Australia  
(Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2019) 
 
3.3.4 What stands out in Figure 7 is that: 
3.3.4.1 economic cycles occur every ten years on average (Investopedia, 
2019), PPPs are cyclical either because of fluctuating economic 
conditions such as funding and investment risks and/or the scope of 
projects themselves which is further evidenced by the economic 
recession of 2008/2009, which saw a decline in investments 
globally, but it was also almost the same time that the concept of 
blue economy emerged, whereafter PPP projects saw an increase; 
3.3.4.2 not every Australian state uses PPP projects every year, with on 
average only two states using PPPs for its infrastructure 
development; 
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3.3.4.3 New South Wales on the whole enjoys greater PPP investments as 
compared to other states.  
3.3.5 The Australian National PPP Policy Framework (“APPPF”) has as its purpose 
the delivery of improved infrastructure and service delivery as well as better 
value for money (Public - Private Partnership Legal Research Center, 2018). 
(Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development, 2015). 
3.3.6 What was quite interesting from the literature available on Australian PPPs, 
was a study conducted by Bianchi et al  that focused on problems encountered 
with infrastructure projects where financial losses have been disclosed to the 
public and recommendations on the reduction of complexities in connection 
with infrastructure and PPP investment decisions (Bianchi, 2017). After having 
examined 155 PPPs for the period 1986 to 2016, Bianchi et al (Bianchi, 2017) 
deduced the following: 
3.3.6.1 there is a one 20% to 25% probability that PPPs fail as a consequence 
of unexpected financial losses  ; 
3.3.6.2 risks associated with PPP projects are dependent on costs structures 
and not only associated with revenue streams; 
3.3.6.3 most private entities who concluded a PPP arrangement had no 
mandatory financial or related reporting obligations and/or their 
information were not available in the public domain. 
3.3.7 Bianchi et al in their study further demonstrated that only approximately 11% 
of Australian PPPs studied were considered problematic or failed PPPs. A 
similar pattern of results from a cost perspective was obtained by Petersen who 
revealed that PPPs are on average 11.4% cheaper in comparison to traditional 
procurement methods (Petersen, 2019).  
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3.3.8 The main limitation of the Bianchi et al study is that the data set considered 
was mainly limited to financial data and there are of course many other factors 
that contribute and have been proven to contribute to the PPPs in question 
failing (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017) or succeeding as highlighted above 
and as will be examined further.  
 
3.3.9 Two apparent limitations of the Petersen study, as identified therein, is that it 
does not include evidence on value for money or quality of infrastructure 
(Petersen, 2019), which would assist in truly understanding the intrinsic value 
of Australian PPPs. 
 
3.3.10 Australia applies best practices for PPPs, which have more stringent risk 
assessments and management outputs to its traditional procurement and other 
contracting methods (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017). 
3.3.11 Despite having a sound PPP Framework with by and large “on time and within 
budget” PPP contracts (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017) (Bianchi, 2017), the 
states within Australia are not very trigger happy to conclude PPP Projects.  
3.3.12 The PPP data available for Australia, including Figure 7 above, seems to 
suggest that it has in recent years relied more and more on traditional 
procurement methods as opposed to PPPs (Bianchi, 2017).  
3.3.13 The foregoing assumption is not necessarily true for all infrastructure projects, 
as just two years before the Bianchi et al study (Bianchi, 2017) Werneck and 
Saadi opined that unsolicited proposals have become more popular because of 
the incentives including lower tender lower costs in comparison to traditional 
procurement  (Wernek, 2015), but it can be assumed that it depends on the type 
of private investor or sector. 
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3.3.14  A “public interest, public benefit and public policy” test is applied in Australia 
when deciding on a PPP delivery method (Wernek, 2015).  It appears that the 
test applies after approval of the PPP route and therein lies the weakness of the 
test, as a better test would be to apply the test prior to PPP approval, that it 
when considering whether or not to use PPPs.  
3.3.15 One pioneering approach of Australia is that albeit some projects falling below 
the required value threshold, if they are proven to have significant value for 
money, they will be treated as PPPs, alternatively projects are pooled together 
to meet the required threshold (Wernek, 2015).  The said impressive approach 
would be ideal for the Namibian port or maritime industry, moreso given the 
multi – model transport approach adopted by modernised ports worldwide 
(Serdjo, 2012). 
 
3.4  Lessons Learnt from South Africa and Australia 
 
3.4.1 South African Experience  
 
3.4.1.1  This section is dedicated to further recording lessons Namibia can learn from 
the experience of South Africa and Australia 
 
3.4.1.2 One of the commendable approaches to PPP monitoring and evaluation by the 
South African Treasury and presently absent in Namibia’s PPP framework is 
that the PPP Unit of South Africa’s has the following compliance requirements 




Figure 8:  South African Treasury Governance and Compliance Standards and 
Requirements (Arimoro, 2018)  (National Treasury South Africa, nd) 
 
3.4.2 Australian Experience  
 
3.4.2.1 Australia is known for having a very transparent reporting system and in line 
therewith, the transparency approaches and practices listed of the Australian 




Figure 9: Market Analysis based on volume and value of PPPs per year in Australia 
(Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2019) 
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3.4.2.2 The one limitation identified in Figure 9 is that no mention is made of 
transparency, sustainability and environmental reporting practices and 
transparency practices appear to be limited to the procurement stage of PPPs.  
 
3.4.2.3 The Freedom of Information Act of Australia No 3 of 1982 (hereinafter 
“FOIAA”) provides a legally enforceable right of access to government 
documents (Australian Government, 2017).  
 
3.4.2.4 One of the few scholars that critique Australia’s transparency structures based 
on the Aarhus Convention is Wilson who highlights the commercial 
confidentiality exemption provision of FOIAA that prevents disclosure of 
environmental information (Wilson, 2012). Although not legislated, 
Namibia’s reality when it comes to disclose of EIAs is similar and falls far 
short of the South African environmental approaches described above and is 
therefore strongly recommendation for adoption by both Namibia and 
Australia.  
 
3.4.2.5 Wilson clearly did not take into account the fact that a lot has changed since 
1982, which includes the drive for sustainable development and the blue 
economy. It is perhaps an opportune time for Namibia and Australia to 
comprehensively review its approaches to environmental management and 
sustainability, moreso in light of the fact that “environmental protection is 
almost absent in the Australian Constitution” (Australian Parliament, nd). 
 
3.4.2.6 A critical and rhetorical question to ask is how environmental activities that 
may negatively impact the living conditions and/or livelihoods of civic 
society can be treated as confidential under FIOAA and/or not be provided 
for in Australia’s Constitution because the impact of environmental activities 
can interfere with human rights that are entrenched in Australia’s Constitution 
to mention but one point. 
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3.4.2.7 Stakeholders should have the right to any documentation concerning the 
environment and this gap or vacuum should be addressed in both Namibia 
and Australia. The TNPA stakeholder inclusivity processes for environmental 
matters are important lessons for both Namibia (including Namport) and 
Australia. 
 
3.4.2.8 Not many scholars have challenged the Australian PPPs from a transparency 
perspective. Jefferies and McGeorge concluded that sustainable PPP 
procurement methods include extensive stakeholder engagement and greater 
rewards are provided for the entire community (Jefferies, 2009). 
 
3.4.2.9 The work of  Stafford seems to suggest that not all Australian PPP projects 
are as effective as documented with a number of policy, transparency, 
accountability and socio – economic concerns having been raised by 
Australian communities on PPP projects (Stafford, 2017). This is an 
important finding in the understanding of the vagaries of PPPs. 
 
3.4.2.10  Stafford’s study further supports the argument that one can have world class 
legislative and institutional structures in place, but civic society is one of the 
most decisive elements that can be a deal breaker for a PPP project.  
 
3.5  PPP Governance Lessons for Namibia, South Africa and Australia  
 
 
3.5.1  Despite South Africa being “one of the leading countries in the world in law, 
policy and systems for public private partnerships” (National Treasury PPP 
Unit), it has not been immune to challenges with issues such as lack of required 
skills and resources and corruption (Burger, 2009). The issue of corruption is 
not limited to South Africa and many an African country including Namibia 
has fallen victim to alleged and proven corrupt practices under public 
procurement (Otairua, 2013) 
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3.5.2 Bearing in mind that PPPs are an alternative to procurement with a very 
different mandate to that of Treasury who manages South Africa’s economic 
policy, finances and budget (Burger, 2009), South Africa should seriously 
consider creating a more independent PPP Unit with clear Chinese walls 
between the two very distinct characteristics to procurement, despite their 
similarities. 
3.5.3 To further support the stated view, according to the Government Procurement 
Law Review, the main grounds for review of South Africa’s procurement 
include issues of bias, lack of authority, non – compliance with a mandatory 
and material procedure and condition, procedural unfairness, material 
influence by an error of law, ulterior purpose or motive, unauthorised or 
unwarranted influence, unlawfulness, irrationality and failure to take a decision 
and unreasonable grounds of review (Davey, 2017).  
 3.5.4 In his thesis, Bruchez looked at South Africa’s infrastructure needs versus 
sectors in which PPPs were most prevalent, which study revealed that only half 
of all PPPs are implemented in sectors considered as ideal for PPPs, being 
transportation and generic facilities (Bruchez, 2014). 
 
3.5.5. What can be inferred from the study of Bruchez is that even if South African 
has so – called world class procurement and PPP frameworks in place, it does 
not mean to say that all South African PPP projects are successful, because as 
is the case with any policy or law, it is about consistent implementation and 
compliance with not only the letter, but the spirit of the law with good 






3.5.6 Cognisant of different contexts and dynamics in different countries, a useful 
PPP governance study was conducted by Xiong et al (Xiong, 2019), which 
study identified PPP success factors, that is, after having sieved through 69237 
reviewed articles in leading journals. 
3.5.7 The findings of the Xiong et al study, that was not sector or country specific, 
identified the relationship between governance issues as well as success or 
failure of PPP outcomes from a contractual, institutional, managerial and 
organisational point of view, which are important findings in the understanding 
of critical success factors and best practices (Xiong, 2019). 
3.5.8 What Figure 10 reveals is that governance of PPPs are multidimensional and 
requires the involvement of numerous internal and external actors (Levitt, 
2016), but it would have been more relevant if a more detailed study is done 
on the twenty – one governance issues in the PPP success network of  Xiong 
et al especially the extent of public participation from a social value 
perspective.  
 
Figure 10: Mindmap of Governance Factors linked to successful PPP outcomes   
(Xiong, 2019) 
 
                                                 
37 The reviewed articles in short contained 122 case studies in 27 countries and 18 sectors. 
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3.5.9 Xiong et al clearly recognises the crucial role that governance plays in the 
success or failure of PPPs (Xiong, 2019) and of interest from the said study is 
the fact that Australia was the top ranking country for successful PPPs. What 
was also gleaned from the Xiong et al study is that even the United Kingdom 
that is seen to be the most advanced in terms of PPPs also recorded failed PPPs 
(Xiong, 2019). 
3.5.10 The Levitt and Erikkson study on a governance model for infrastructure 
development argues that Australia developed working practices and models 
that address many key governance challenges (Levitt, 2016), but one of the 
weaknesses of this study is that it fails to identify how the governance 
challenges are overcome or handled by public and private actors and it would 
have been better for Levitt and Erikkson to further delve into such practices 
and models as part understanding the relationship between actors. 
3.5.11 The relevance of the foregoing is that it further demonstrates that governance 
requires more than just sound legislative, regulatory frameworks and 
management practices (Xiong, 2019) and the true test lies in the application of 
good governance principles (O'Shea, 2018). 
3.5.12 A comprehensive literature review shows that numerous researchers have 
shifted their attention to investigating and assessing PPP success factors (Osei-
Kyei, 2015) given the crucial role that governance places in the success and 
failure of PPPs (Xiong, 2019). 
 
3.5.13 There exists a considerable body of literature on PPP best practices, moreso 
numerous scholars have developed governance frameworks and critical 





3.5.13.1 Roehrich who argued that combining the strengths of public actors 
such as public accountability, social justice, social responsibility 
and local knowledge is crucial for delivering successful PPP 
outcomes (Roehrich, 2014); 
 
3.5.13.2 Osei – Kyei and Chan that revealed that a transparent procurement 
process is amongst the top critical success factors that must be 
applied throughout the PPP process. (Osei-Kyei, 2015). 
 
3.5.13.3 the findings of Wu et al in their study of government’s 
accountability in PPPs that “effectiveness of quality services and 
the efficiency of use of public resources for asset end – users and 
general population” (Wu, 2016); 
 
3.5.13.4 Garvin that recognised that PPP contracts cannot possibly account 
for every potential contingency and that contracts should vary 
across sectors that suit the context of each PPP project (Garvin, 
2009); 
 
3.5.13.5 Aerts et al, amongst others, revealed technical innovation, 
knowledge transfer, open  communication and proper  stakeholder  
management are critical for successful PPPs (Aerts, 2014); 
 
3.5.13.6 You et al in their study on uncertainty, opportunity and governance 
of construction contracts demonstrated the need for contracts to 
allow for a degree of flexibility to cater for unforeseen 
circumstances relating to inflation, adverse weather conditions and 




3.5.13.7  Meersman et al argued that the preconditions for successful PPPs 
include only pursuing PPP projects where there is “a social and 
economic need”, adequate consultation and communication of 
benefits procedures, governments commencing with projects most 
likely to succeed, significant risk transfer to the private sector and 
PPP projects should be of interest to international private sector 
investors (Meersman, 2014). 
 
 
3.5.14 The above suggested governance frameworks and critical success factors 
recommended by learned scholars are extremely useful, but not conclusive or 
exhaustive because the extant literature on PPP critical success factors for PPPs 
is extensive. Be that as it may, the literature referenced herein is reliable and 
authoritative because the said studies and assessments were based on very 
detailed and comprehensive research and literature reviews.  
 
3.5.15 Whilst recognising that that there are various approaches to critical success 
factors (Chou, 2015), the above governance frameworks and critical success 
factors for PPPs serves as a good yardstick for maximising PPP growth and 
successes. However a closer look to the literature on critical success factors for 
PPPs  reveals a number of gaps and shortcomings that have criticised for not 
being all – inclusive. (Johnston, 2007) (Xiong, 2019), which includes the 
omitting civic society and social value generation (Singh, 2016) from the 
successful PPP outcomes equations as – it – were, notwithstanding a number 
of authors actually made valuable contributions in that regard.  
 
3.6  Summary  
 
3.6.1 What the literature review and comparative analysis of South Africa and 
Australia have demonstrated is that one can have world – class legislative and 
regulatory compliance requirements, but in the absence of consistent 
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application, implementation, compliance and monitoring mechanisms 
cemented by sound and comprehensive PPP legal and governance machineries, 
successful PPP outcomes is reduced, moreso world class legislative and 
regulatory frameworks become toothless bulldogs, if not futile.  
3.6.2 It has also transpired that Namibia’s PPP framework quite evidently has 
limitations and failed to meet one of the critical objectives of its PPP 
framework, being to provide for principles, frameworks and guiding 
procedures throughout the lifecycle of a PPP project. 
3.6.3 The said analysis has further proven that at its core, PPPs require a conducive 
environment (World Bank Group, 2015) and a multi – faceted approach 
(Bruchez, 2014) to flourish, hence the need for Namibia to formulate guiding 
policies, directives, checklists, toolkits and other governance and compliance 
documents for PPPs in Namibia.  
 
3.6.4 It is therefore recommended that urgent attention be given to the possible 
shortcomings identified in Namibia’s PPP Framework as part of creating a 
conducive environment for PPPs to thrive in Namibia. 
 
3.6.5 The application of good governance and PPP critical success factors 
throughout the lifecycle of PPPs is essential (Higuchi, 2019) and it is 
specifically recommended that the PPP Unit of Namibia without delay 
develops a harmonised PPP Policy and Guidelines covering the entire lifecycle 
of PPPs.  
 
3.6.6 It was further reasoned that in the absence of monitoring PDN and SME 
performance throughout the PPP life cycle in Namibia will make it difficult to 
measure what value such empowerment provisions have actually added and 
will ultimately defeat the purpose of having these empowerment provision in 
Namibia’s PPP framework. 
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3.6.7 Due to the vagaries and complexities involved in PPPs a thorough assessment 
(Davey, 2017) and more pertinently the options available to Government must 
be explored when considering PPP port development projects.  
 
3.6.8 There lies a serious danger in pursuing a PPP merely because it meets a PPP 
definition and to avert that danger a proper needs analysis must therefore be 
conducted (National Treasury South Africa, nd). 
3.6.9 There must be a shift towards ascertaining what gap, if any, will be closed, how 
success of the PPP will be measured, what value for money will be achieved, 
whether a proposed PPP route is viable and what the alternatives to PPPs are 
(Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017).  
3.6.10 One of the most important findings that emerged from the comparison and 
literature review  is that combining the strengths of public actors such as public 
accountability, social justice, social responsibility and local knowledge is 
crucial for delivering successful PPP outcomes. 
3.6.11 A very important issue raised is that Namibia, South Africa and Australia need 
not adopt the Aarhus Convention and can simply include access, transparency, 
accountability and participation in decision – making as a requirement in their 
PPP frameworks, but ideally the Aarhus Convention should be ratified and 
implemented.  
 
3.6.12 The PoM case study to be discussed in the next chapter will further amplify the 







Chapter 4 A Case Study of the Port of Melbourne PPP   
 
This Chapter 4 will focus on a case study of PoM lease in Australia to draw insights 
and learnings for Namibia’s PPP port development endeavours. 
4.1  Overview: Port of Melbourne Lease 
 
4.1.1 As previously stated, the selection of this case study was mainly informed by 
the fact that Australia has a very advanced PPP framework (KPMG, 2015) 
(Yescombe E. R., 2007). Additionally for the similarities that the PoM shares 
with the Port of Walvis Bay in Namibia, that is, both PoM and the Port of 
Walvis Bay are the main commercial and multi – purpose ports handling 
containerised and non – containerised cargoes.  
4.1.2 PoM is one of the busiest container ports in Australia, one of the top sixty 
container ports in the world38 with a container throughput of approximately 
two million containers per annum (Essential Services Commission, 2017). 
The PoM Corporation, like Namport, is an entity created by statute that has 
managed, regulated and operated the PoM for years. 
4.1.3 Following a Project Blue scoping study conducted by KPMG Australia 
(KPMG International, 2014) (The Age, 2015), Australia passed legislation to 
lease the commercial operation of  PoM to a private operator for a tenure of 
fifty years (Essential Services Commission, 2017). 
4.1.4 The PoM long – term lease was subsequently awarded to the Lonsdale 
Consortium39 for a price tag of  USD 9,7 billion (Essential Services 
Commission, 2017) (ABC News, 2016).  
                                                 
38 Based on 2015 results. 
39 Only received three bids mainly from finance consortiums  were received Comprising Future Fund, QIC, Global Infrastructure Partners and 
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Scheme. 
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4.1.5 The statutory regulatory function of Victorian Ports Corporation (previously 
PoM Corporation) (Melbourne Port Lessor (Pty) Ltd, 2018) as set out in its 
Port Management Act No. 82 of 1995 remains unaffected post 1 November 
2016 when Lonsdale took over (Essential Services Commission, 2017). 
4.1.6 Some of the key difference noted in the Australian PPP Framework (Australian 
Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015), 
compared to Namibia, and that Namibia can learn from, is that Australia: 
 
4.1.6.1 has an integrated approach to strategic infrastructure planning; 
 
4.1.6.2 applies a rigorous cost – benefit analysis and value for money 
interrogation before even considering the PPP route as a method for 
service delivery and infrastructure; 
 
4.1.6.3 employs a value for money approach during the entire lifecycle of a 
PPP project as well as a capital scarcity and balance sheet approach 
as part of its value for money approach; 
 
4.1.6.4 ensures that all decisions from evaluation to fruition of the project 
considers the potential impact on public interest matters such as 
privacy, accountability, health and safety, consumer rights, public 
access and equity, and 
 
4.1.6.5 developed a national PPP Policy and Practitioners Guidelines. 
 
4.1.7 The below Figure 11 provides a brief summary of the regulatory regime 
developed for the PoM by the Commission that is responsible for monitoring 
and reporting on the economic activities such as the PoM lease awarded to 






Figure 11: PoM Regulatory Regime  (Essential Services Commission, 2017) 
 
 
4.1.8 As will be seen from Figure 11, safeguards for both contracting parties have 
been built into the regime, that is protecting the rights of both Lonsdale and the 
Australian Government. The regulatory regime of PoM would have been more 
comprehensive to have details on the role that civic society and other 
stakeholders played in the PoM lease and to what extent transparency 
compliance requirements, if present, are applied.  
 
4.1.9 A glaring issue raised by  Kommalapati is the fact that once the Consumer Price 
Index cap expires after 15 years, it means Lonsdale will no longer be regulated 
and it can determine their own port tariffs and may squeeze profit margins to 
the detriment of port users and he further draws an analogy with the 40% 





4.1.10 Although not mentioned in the Kommalapatis critique of PoM, the business 
case of Geelong Port referred to in Figure 11 may also be affected by unilateral 
decisions taken by Lonsdale after expiration of the 15 years price cap and no 
evidence could be found showing that the said likelihood may materialise.  
 
 
4.2  Shortcomings and Pitfalls of Port of Melbourne Lease 
 
4.2.1  It is important to note that despite Australia and State Victoria having a sound 
PPP legal and regulatory framework, according to media reports, the contract 
close for the PoM lease was met with resistance both politically and from the 
public40 (Maritime Herald, 2016) and not much research or information 
evaluating the reasons for the resistance could be traced and it would have been 
interesting to have an in – depth understanding of what the reasons for the 
resistance were. 
4.2.2 Prior to the PoM contract award and close, Kommalapati observed that public 
opposition to the lease was scant and he argued that selling the profit making 
PoM was not plausible and once PoM reaches it capacity in 10 to 15 years 
“residents and commuters will face increased truck traffic and the associated 
problem of noise, congestion, pollution and road deterioration” (Kommalapati, 
2016).  
4.2.3 These are important observations and it is unclear whether these contingencies 
were built into the study conducted by KPMG, but Kommalapatis concerns are 
further supported by an inquiry of the proposed PoM lease about the port 
related truck traffic concerns raised by stakeholders from a “congestion, 
environmental and health perspective” (Parliament of Victoria Legislative 
Council Port of Melbourne Select Committee, 2015).  
                                                 
40 All of whom in their bids confirmed that port operations would be outsourced to private terminal operators. 
 72
4.2.4 Perhaps one of the most significant insight of the then proposed PoM Inquiry 
is the finding that stakeholders were incapable of commenting on the possible 
impact and viability of the PoM lease (Parliament of Victoria Legislative 
Council Port of Melbourne Select Committee, 2015).  
4.2.5 The implication of the above – mentioned finding means that stakeholder 
consultation will not suffice and stakeholders must be put in a position to speak 
from a place of knowledge and make meaningful contributions, failing which 
it will defeat the purpose of involving stakeholders in decision making 
processes in the first place. This argument further supports writer’s 
recommendation in Chapter 3 that stakeholders’ liaison is not enough in 
guaranteeing access to information and participation in decision making as 
cemented by the Aarhus Convention.  
4.2.6 Other than the foregoing criticism, several questions remain unanswered, that 
being, whether the legitimate concerns of stakeholders listed in the said PoM 
Inquiry report  (Parliament of Victoria Legislative Council Port of Melbourne 
Select Committee, 2015) were in fact addressed and whether the stakeholders 
included all the relevant non – state actors.  
4.2.7 The findings supports the notion that having sound governance and PPP 
framework is not nearly enough. What is particularly important to flag in the 
Chen et al study on the latest trends, drivers, processes and impacts of 
Australian port privatisation is that there remains the risk of  “undervaluing 
port assets, increased port charges, impeded port competition, less port 
investment, and less concern for the public interest in the long term” (Chen, 
2016). 
 
4.2.8 As much as all the findings of Chen et al (Chen, 2016) are important to note, 
special attention is drawn to the issue of public interest, because to sideline 
legitimate concerns of civic society and relevant non – state actors is 
tantamount to denying a country its socio – economic development cognisant 
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that socio – economic development is the principal driver of PPPs. One way to 
overcome that problem and very real risk is to include a deal breaker provision 
in PPP contracts for Namibia or any country venturing into port development 
and related PPPs. 
 
4.2.9 Chen et al also acknowledges that the impact of port privatisation cannot 
following its implementation be gleaned in the short – term and it would 
therefore be premature to draw conclusions (Chen, 2016). The same rings true 
for the PoM lease that is still in its infancy stages, which is part of the reason 
why writer hereof was confronted with the problem that the impact of the PoM 
lease has not been studied, as yet. 
 
 
4.3  Summary  
 
4.3.1 The PoM case study demonstrates the importance of  taking a long – term view 
during and beyond the tenure of PPPs is a critical decision making tool in 
deciding what form a PPP should take and/or whether or not to actually pursue 
a PPP relationship. 
4.3.2 The existing literature on PPPs disappointingly does not to a large extent deal 
with the extent of the relationship with civic society and other non – state 
actors.  
4.3.2 Moreover, the PoM lease has proven that striking an equilibrium between the 
rights of both a private entity and a public enterprise is key to enabling 
successful PPPs, more so as part of finding a fair, equitable and optimal 




Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions  
 
 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions  
 
 
5.1.1  Ports have a critical role to play in shaping trade, growth and the socio – 
economic landscape of Namibia, as is the case globally. It would appear that 
Namibia’s PPP framework in its current form is not fit for purpose or adequate 
to respond to Namibia’s port development and blue economy ambitions. 
 
5.1.2 Unfortunately, most studies on the subject of PPPs have mostly been restricted 
to the economic, financial and administration pillars of PPPs, albeit one of the 
most important drivers of PPPs, being the social value to civic society. 
Furthermore, studies revealed that key actors such as civic society tend to be 
overlooked or sidelined throughout the PPP lifecycle.  
 
5.1.3 Having examined the PPP framework for South Africa and Australia, this 
research has further concluded that good governance requires much more 
multifaceted interrogations in deciding whether or not to actually use a PPP to 
close port infrastructure and service gaps and/or as a tool to attract private 
sector investment (Beuve, 2018) for the port development leg of Namibia’s 
blue economy. 
 
5.1.4 What was also observed from the research herein is that PPPs are not suitable 
for all types of projects. 
 
5.1.5 Having world class legislative, regulatory, oversight, monitoring structures are 
key mechanisms as part of creating a conducive and sustainable environment 
for PPPs, which it is argued will attract and retain much needed private sector 
investments. 
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5.1.6 One of the most important insights is that the main purpose of PPPs is “to 
provide better infrastructure and services to the population in a way that creates 
value for money” as part of closing infrastructure gaps due to budgetary 
controls and deficits (Reyes-Tagle, 2018). 
 
5.1.7 The following additional significant findings and lessons learnt emerged from 
the comparative legal analysis conducted in chapter 3 and 4: 
5.1.7.1 when deciding whether or not to use a PPP for infrastructure 
development, a detailed business case and needs analysis must be 
conducted to ascertain whether the PPP will deliver better value for 
money as compared to other traditional procurement methods; 
5.1.7.2 a public interest and public policy test must be conducted when 
considering PPPs as a means for infrastructure development or service 
delivery (Wernek, 2015); 
5.1.7.3 as part of safeguarding the rights of both parties to a PPP contract, 
there must be an optimal sharing of risks, that is, to the party best 
placed to manage the risks so identified; 
5.1.7.4 fortifying PPPs as a long term port development solution requires the 
consistent application of governance principles of transparency, 
public accountability and reporting, co – operation, fairness, equity, 
competition and optimal risk sharing; 
5.1.7.5 stakeholder engagement and involvement of all actors and 
stakeholders, alongside transparency and accountability is the golden 
thread that must run throughout the PPP process;  
5.1.7.6 the importance of having an independent PPP Unit in place with the 
required cross – functional skills and resources is essential; 
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5.1.7.7 capacity building and in – depth skills development programmes for 
persons not only in the PPP Unit, but for all focal points employed at 
various Government bodies and enterprises is key;  
5.1.7.8 clearly defined performance measures and targets must be identified 
and applied, that is beyond financial and administrative functions, as 
part of defining how success of a PPP will be measured; 
5.1.7.9 a long – term view during and beyond the tenure of PPPs is a critical 
decision making tool in deciding whether or not to actually pursue a 
PPP relationship and/or the specific form a PPP should take, and 
5.1.7.10 regardless of the approach taken, it is ultimately about preserving state 
assets, protecting civic society and end users, whilst simultaneously 






5.2.1 Cognisant of the socio – political – economic and legal environment as well as 
other circumstances that may affect port development in Namibia, the five  
recommendations hereinafter listed are considered realistic and worth pursuing 
as a matter of priority at this stage of Namibia’s PPP journey as part of securing 
successful PPP outcomes for Namibia’s port development, which 
recommendations will be presented to the Namibian Government’s for its 
consideration and adoption: 
 
5.2.1.1 amend the Namport Act to include a new section that allows Namport 
to contract with private investors or terminal operators to design, 
build, rehabilitate, develop, finance, maintain and operate port 
terminals or facilities; 
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5.2.1.2 the Aarhus Convention must be ratified and implemented by Namibia 
and pending same, the Namibian PPP framework to be amended to 
include civic society having the right to be provided with the right to 
access to information, participation in decision making and to seek 
justice concerning sustainability and environmental issues and 
activities;  
5.2.1.3 the Namibian PPP Unit to develop and issue a harmonised PPP Policy 
and Guidelines for every envisaged sector covering the entire lifecycle 
of PPPs to be developed; 
5.2.1.4 immediate adoption and strict adherence to proven PPP governance 
principles of transparency, accountability, optimal risk sharing, 
stakeholder involvement and communication before, during and after 
the lifecycle of a PPP project, and 
 
5.2.1.5 the development of a blue economy strategy similar to that of 
Operation Phakisa as a matter of priority, with clear targets that are 
monitored and feedback loops provided to all interested and affected 
stakeholders and actor. 
 
 
5.3 Future Research  
 
 
5.3.1 A number of realistic recommendations for immediate adoption and 
implementation have been given, but future research is certainly required to 
disentangle the complexities of PPPs, governance challenges and to further 






5.3.2 The observation of possible conflict of laws is an important area for a follow 
up research on the topic of this dissertation, moreso a systematic and 
comprehensive review on the various PPP and blue economy sectors within 
Namibia from a policy, practice and outcomes perspective should be 
conducted, as part of developing a synergised and integrated oceans strategy, 
which strategy must examine the socio – economic potential of Namibia’s 
extended continental shelf. 
 
5.3.3 Future research should also study the impact that civic society involvement in 
decision – making has on PPP projects to understand and justify their 
importance, moreso the value add such actors bring to successful PPP 
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